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Key points 
 
• There are no obvious methods for a systematic examination of devolution’s 
impact on the economy, so this breifing sets out a framework for understanding 
devolution’s economic impact rather than quantifying that impact 
• Among the potential positive impacts are:  
o a more efficient distribution of competences between UK and devolved levels 
o better satisfaction of Scottish policy preferences, via new patterns of public 
expenditure and better information 
o more effective policy implementation 
• Among the potential negative impacts are:  
o the costs of building and running the devolved institutions 
o loss of UK-wide economies of scale in policy-making 
o greater capacity for lobbying by sectional interests 
o the economic impacts of the Barnett formula and fiscal autonomy 
o greater inter-regional policy spillovers 
• Overall, the impact of devolution on the Scottish economy is likely to be complex, 
subtle and difficult to measure – not least because the institutional arrangements 
were not fashioned with due consideration to their economic impacts 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This briefing sets out a framework for addressing the question: Is devolution good for 
the Scottish economy? We are currently implementing the approach and shall report 
the results in due course.  
 
We begin with two observations.  
 
• Economic issues were clearly not the sole, or even the primary, motivation for 
Scottish devolution. However, given the current priority given to the 
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decentralised delivery of policies to improve productivity the effect is of 
considerable interest. 
• Devolution being “good for the Scottish economy” is not necessarily the same 
thing as being “good for the Scottish people”. If, for example, Scotland 
wanted to become “greener”, this could imply a desire for slower growth than 
in the rest of the UK. 
 
We set out below the aggregate effects and the specific mechanisms through which 
devolution might be expected to impact on the economy. 
 
 
The Scottish Economy before and after devolution 
 
It seems reasonable to begin by examining the Scottish economy pre- and post-
devolution in an attempt to identify any measurable change in economic performance. 
However, nothing definitive comes from this exercise. Such (time-series based) 
analyses that seek to establish the impact of policy changes are well-established, but 
have well-known limitations: 
 
• It is difficult to control fully for all influences other than devolution, and this 
could lead to incorrect attribution to devolution of effects that are in fact due 
to other disturbances that have impacted on the Scottish economy 
• We have only had six years of experience post-devolution, and so very few 
observations with which to compare the situation prior to devolution  
• We might expect that at least some devolution effects would take time to 
become established, for example, re-allocation of public expenditures may be 
seriously constrained by contracts 
• Devolution in Scotland is a very significant political change. But is it such a 
big change in terms of the economy? Small changes are difficult to detect 
 
More subtle qualitative changes which do not register on aggregate statistics, such as 
a more appropriate allocation of public expenditure, cannot be identified in this way. 
 
 
An overview of the arguments concerning the economic impact of devolution 
 
Devolution in Scotland has involved a shift from a region with significant 
administrative decentralisation and ministerial influence in cabinet to one with its own 
devolved government. The economic influence of devolution therefore really focuses 
on the benefits of democratically-informed formulation, implementation and 
monitoring of policies, as against polices determined centrally but often delivered in a 
decentralised manner.  
 
The conventional economic arguments for devolution concern the provision and 
financing of local public goods (such as health and education expenditures). The 
potential gains from devolution are identified in the first column of Table 1 and the 
costs in the second. 
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Table 1. The Economic Benefits and Costs of Scottish Devolution 
Potential benefits  Potential Costs 
Provision better reflecting local preferences 
 
The direct administration costs of an additional 
layer of government (in this case the Scottish 
Parliament)  
Local democratic accountability improving: 
efficiency of policy formulation, implementation, 
innovation 
Inadequate monitoring, implementation and 
evaluation. (Is HM Treasury tougher than the 
Scottish Parliament?)  
Better information on the local economic 
environment 
 
The loss of economies of scale in the conduct of 
policy 
 
Increased rent seeking 
Barnett gives hard budget constraint (for 
discretionary expenditures) and the tax varying 
power allows marginal changes in taxation and 
spending 
Smaller budget due to strict adherence to Barnett 
 
No mechanism linking public spending with tax 
revenues raised in Scotland
1
  
Lower coordination/ compliance costs Reduced co-ordination with the rest of the UK 
 
 
Economic benefits of Scottish devolution 
 
a) Does the Scottish-UK system at least allow potential efficiency gains from 
devolution?  
 
The key issue is whether the allocation of powers among the different levels of 
government in the UK is at least potentially efficient, by avoiding the most obvious 
spillover effects or loss of economies of scale. 
 
b) Is there any direct evidence of better satisfaction of the Scottish people’s 
preferences under devolution? 
 
The direct approach to this issue involves asking people what they think of the 
Scottish Parliament. The Scottish Social Survey provides us with observations on a 
range of attitudes to the Parliament, and so we can investigate the extent to which 
there appears dissatisfaction with the existing settlement. 
 
c) Is there any indirect evidence of better satisfaction of Scottish preferences post 
devolution? 
 
The Scottish Parliament acting in a distinctive fashion from Westminster is indicative 
of change. Of course, the existence of distinctiveness, or apparent policy divergence, 
is not necessarily evidence of innovation, or a reflection of the preferences of the 
Scottish people.  
 
The general allocation of the Scottish Budget. A major element of the Scottish 
Parliament’s power is its discretion over the budget allocated to it through the Barnett 
formula. It is natural therefore to explore changes in the allocation of public 
expenditures in Scotland as against the UK since the introduction of devolution, in 
                                                 
1
 Aspects of this are not costs of devolution per se, but relevant to whether a greater degree of fiscal 
independence would generate larger gains.  
 4 
order to identify any distinctive element and the revealed preferences of the 
Executive. 
 
Other evidence of distinctiveness. Not all policies have a major and immediate impact 
on government expenditures. Perhaps the two most widely publicised sources of 
policy difference between Scotland and Westminster are those on student fees, which 
are set to increase with proposed top-up fees and on the provision of free personal 
care for the elderly, but other differences exist.  The impacts of these policies, even on 
public expenditures, are not yet apparent, and so a full evaluation (on outcomes rather 
than projections) is in any case not yet feasible.  
 
Economic development policies. The key issue is not distinctiveness per se, rather 
whether these have become more differentiated post devolution. One indicator of 
priorities here is the share of expenditure allocated to such activities in Scotland, and 
how this has changed since devolution.  
 
Of course, policy formulation and implementation is about much more than can be 
captured in simple measures of expenditure, and wider analyses of at least the style 
and form of Scottish economic development policies are needed. However what we 
are ultimately interested in is the results of implementing economic development 
policies and this requires effective implementation (see 5 below).  
 
d) Innovation in policy 
 
It is clear that distinctiveness in policy formulation or implementation is a necessary, 
but not a sufficient condition for the presence of innovation.  The basic idea is that 
there is now a greater incentive to be innovative. Also, there is the idea of the 
“laboratory”, with Scotland playing the lead role in respect of its greater degree of 
devolution. Inevitably, judgements on the innovative nature of policies are to a degree 
subjective. 
 
Economic costs of Scottish Devolution 
 
a) Direct costs of the Scottish Parliament 
 
While the traditional literature on fiscal federalism tends to be optimistic about the 
economic benefits of decentralisation in terms of efficiency enhancement, it has little 
to say about the costs of their generation. Yet we know that the establishment of the 
Scottish Parliament has incurred substantial capital costs (in terms of the building 
itself and supporting infrastructure) and recurrent costs in terms of MSPs and 
supporting administration.  
 
b) Lower total budget 
 
If the Barnett formula’s convergence effect is more rigorously adhered to as a 
consequence of devolution this would imply a loss. 
 
c) Loss of scale economies in the policy-making and implementation process. 
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The basic idea is simple: if there are in principle UK-wide economies of scale in the 
policy process or in the provision of devolved public services then devolution 
generates additional costs, even for the provision of an equivalent service. This can be 
examined by looking at patterns of civil service employment change in Scotland and 
the UK to look for any distinctive post-devolution developments.  
 
d) Rent seeking behaviour 
 
The establishment of the Scottish Parliament creates a number of new agents with 
influence over policy, most obviously MSPs, but that also in turn has undoubtedly 
stimulated a host of lobbying organisations and other interest groups. A potential 
problem arises from an efficiency perspective if these agents act in a way as to further 
their own positions, if the latter are not entirely consistent with the wishes of the 
Scottish electorate: such activity is unproductive and imposes an efficiency cost. 
 
e) Adequacy of monitoring and evaluation of policies 
 
One issue is whether the Scottish Parliament is as adept at monitoring and evaluation 
policies as is the UK Treasury. There are a number of considerations here: 
• Should the Treasury’s “Green Book” on the impact of economic development 
initiatives still be implemented in Scotland or should we have a “Tartan Book”  
• Devolved policies in Scotland are not subject to Public Service Agreements as 
are policies in England– is the regime in England tougher? 
• Scottish targets for efficiency gains in the provision of public services are less 
ambitious than those elsewhere 
 
f) Effectiveness of policy implementation?  
 
One issue is the potential tendency to ‘balkanisation’ within a more insular civil 
service. But civil servants may feel more motivated when answerable to political 
masters sensitive to perceptions of policy ineffectiveness. 
  
g) The Barnett formula  
 
The Barnett formula is effectively a means of allocating lump sum transfers to 
devolved authorities. it presents a number of problems: 
• It breaks the link between successful growth policies and tax revenues, so 
moderates incentive for economic growth. 
• Rigorous adherence has an adverse impact on devolved territories2 
• But Barnett does, in principle, offer a hard budget constraint  
 
There already exists a degree of fiscal autonomy: the “tartan tax”.  
• The potential effects of the tax are that:3  
                                                 
2
 See Ferguson, L., McGregor., P.G., Swales, J.K., And Turner, K. (2003), “The Regional Distribution 
of Public Expenditure in the UK: An Exposition and Critique of the Barnett Formula”, in Monnesland, 
J (ed.), Regional Public Finance, European Research in Regional Science 13 (Pion: London). 
3
 McGregor, P.G, Swales, J.K. And Yin, Y.P. (2004), "The Macroeconomic Consequences of Scottish 
Fiscal Autonomy: Inverted Haavelemo Effects in a General Equilibrium Analysis of the “Tartan Tax”", 
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o a balanced-budget rise in taxes would stimulate demand.  
o but would bring adverse supply effects through migration and wage 
bargaining.  
o The net effect - and the role of the Parliament – is unclear.  
• Such considerations would be even more important under greater tax 
autonomy 
 
h) Reduced coordination of policies in the UK 
 
The issues here are the efficiency costs experienced as a consequence of a lack of 
coordination of regional development policies at the centre. Key concerns are the 
scale and direction of interregional spillovers – where initiatives benefiting one region 
may have an adverse effect on another - and the inefficiencies that are generated if 
these are ignored by the devolved authorities. Some provisions have been made to co-
ordinate policies through Concordats, but these are thought to have played a relatively 
limited role. 
 
 
Does devolution in Scotland really stimulate growth? 
 
The UK Government believes devolution/decentralisation stimulates growth. 
However, international evidence on a link between a decentralised government and 
economic growth is limited and ambiguous. For Scotland, the asymmetric nature of 
devolution within the UK might reduce the incentive for innovative, but risky, policy. 
Also any rural bias to its economic development policies might lower the growth rate. 
Further, there are arguments that the degree of fiscal autonomy available to the 
Parliament is too low to encourage growth. The dynamic arguments and empirical 
evidence need to be evaluated. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The impact of devolution on the Scottish economy is likely to be complex, subtle and 
difficult to measure. However, even though the devolution decision was not made on 
economic grounds, and is unlikely to be reversed as a result of poor economic 
performance, this does not reduce the value of further economic evaluation.  The 
Scottish people are broadly content with the present constitutional arrangement: there 
is little evidence of a growing desire either to turn back the clock or to press on for 
independence. However, it is important for the institutional arrangements to be 
fashioned with due consideration to their economic impacts, particularly on 
efficiency: small improvements in Scottish growth will have important, and 
increasing, impacts over time.  
 
This Devolution Briefing was written by Brian K Ashcroft and J Kim Swales of the 
Fraser of Allander Institute and Department of Economics, University of Strathclyde 
and Centre for Public Policy for Regions (CPPR), and Peter G McGregor of the 
Department of Economics, University of Strathclyde and CPPR. The authors 
                                                                                                                                            
paper presented at the British and Irish Regional Science Association meetings St Andrews, September 
2003, forthcoming Strathclyde Papers in Economics. 
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The Devolution and Constitutional Change Programme was set up by ESRC in 2000 
to explore the series of devolution reforms which have established new political 
institutions in Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland, London and the other English 
regions since 1997. It has commissioned 35 projects around the UK to carry out top-
class academic research and to contribute to the policy debates surrounding 
devolution.  
 
For more information see the Programme website at www.devolution.ac.uk or 
contact the Programme Director, Professor Charlie Jeffery at ESRC Devolution 
Programme, School of Social and Political Studies, Adam Ferguson Building, George 
Square, University of Edinburgh. Tel 0131 650 8489, Fax 0131 650 6546, Email 
charlie.jeffery@ed.ac.uk 
 
 
